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NEGATIVE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 98 SANCTIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The first sentence of President Bush's letter of introduction to The National Security Strategy is short but clear: "America is at war." 1 The supporting National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and National Strategy for Homeland Security carry the same message. To win this asymmetric war will require more cooperation and help from our friends and allies than ever before. In the long run, we cannot win the war on our own; accordingly, we must make every effort to not only coordinate and cooperate with our friends and allies, but also to assist those countries that lack the resources to counter transnational threats. Without exception, our national strategy documents remind us that we are a nation at war; further they assert that collective security is vital to success. Our friends and allies are key to winning the Global War on Terrorism.
Our post-9/11 efforts have understandably focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, but the nature of the transnational threat requires that the Western Hemisphere, specifically Central and South America and the Caribbean, not be neglected as it has in the past-the threat is global, not regional. The March 2006 National Security Strategy emphasizes that the United States needs to develop agendas that solidify strategic relationships. The following points apply to our Western Hemisphere: 1) Our own Hemisphere is the frontline of defense of American national security.
2) Our goal is security cooperation.
3) Countries in the Western Hemisphere must be aided in the path to sustained political and economic development.
4) If America's nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure.
5) Our strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and Mexico.
6) We must also solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values.
7)
We must continue to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region's stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress.
8) Together, these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people. Sanctions imposed on the IMET program significantly impacted U.S. educational institutions (both military and civilian) to varying degrees -revealing indisputably that the sanctions are negatively affecting these institutions. Some institutions accepted the loss stoically while others made funding adjustments to meet the challenge. But most were adamant in expressing their view that the sanctions created a vacuum that permitted competing states to address the military needs of our partners. Thus the sanctions continue to impact negatively on our future military interaction with our hemispheric allies. This SRP illustrates how much time and energy has been spent both by the U.S. interagency and by all the countries involved in dealing with the political impact of Article 98. In fact, the term "Article 98" is as readily recognized by regional politicians today as it is by military commanders and armed forces personnel.
Recent positive steps by means of National Interest Waivers (NIWs) have been taken by President Bush to remedy the negative impact of Article 98 sanctions on our partner nations. It is important to note that we are not seeking immunity for our citizens, but a simple, non-surrender agreement as contemplated in the Rome Statute. We fully commit ourselves to, where appropriate, investigate and prosecute serious, credible allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide that have been made against any of our people.
Signatories of the Statute of Rome have created an ICC to their liking, and they should live with it. The United States did not agree to be bound, and must not be held to its terms.
14 Although the ICC today is a functioning reality, the U.S. position is that it continues to be a forceful advocate for accountability of perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. However, the United States is confident that there are more suitable alternatives to the ICC. Some recommendations are:
States pursue credible justice at home rather than abdicating responsibility to an international body.
Where domestic legal institutions are lacking, but domestic will is present, the international community must be prepared to assist in creating the capacity to address the violations. This includes political, financial, legal, and logistical support.
Where domestic will is non-existent, the international community can intervene through the UN Security Council, consistent with the UN charter.
Ad hoc international mechanisms may be created under the auspices of the UN Security Council, as was done to establish the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or hybrid courts --consisting of international participants and the affected state participants --can be authorized, as in the case of Sierra Leone. The Bush Administration appears to be divided over whether to continue linking U.S. As to Chile and the ICC, we do have certain statutory requirements concerning the ICC. I think you're probably aware of, as I testified yesterday that we're looking at the issues concerning those situations in which we may have, in a sense, sort of the same as shooting ourselves in the foot, which is, I guess, what we mean. By having to put off aid to countries with which we have important counterterrorism or counter drug or in some cases, in some of our allies, it's even been cooperation in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. And so I think we just have to look at it. And we're certainly reviewing it and we'll consult with Congress about it. But I think it's important from time that we take a look to make sure that we're not having a negative effect on the relationships that are really important to us from the point of view of getting our security environment --improving the security environment. Unfortunately, the unintended consequence of that is this International Military Education and Training program, the IMET.
And we are losing, every day, engagement opportunities with many nations around the world.
And over the years, as you said, this has benefited them. But to bring them to our schools, our institutions, they have the opportunity to live in our culture, see strong democratic institutions. Civilian leadership of the military is a powerful thing.
We gain from the engagement, the contact. We understand them better. When we're there, we're more appreciative and knowledgeable of their culture. And we're losing that in very critical countries.
I have been a strong advocate to de-link the IMET program from the ASPA sanction in order that we can engage and not lose contact with a generation or two or three of officers or noncommissioned officers in countries that are important to us and it's important to them to be linked with us.
So I certainly support and endorse any way possible that we can get this program back on track.
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The security forces in Latin America and the Caribbean that were trained by the IMET program are essential to maintain a check on potential transnational threats emerging from U.S.
Southern Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). A recent Congressional report indicated
that "Venezuela is providing support --including identity documents -that could prove useful to radical Islamic groups." The report continues:
The Venezuelan government has issued thousands of 'cedulas,' the equivalent of social security cards, to people from Cuba, Colombia and 'Middle Eastern' nations that host foreign terrorist organizations. Recently, and just as alarmingly, several Pakistanis were apprehended at the US-Mexican border with fraudulent Venezuelan documents. According to senior US military and intelligence officials, Venezuela is emerging as a potential hub of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere, providing assistance to Islamic radicals from the Middle East and other terrorists. US immigration and customs enforcement investigations have revealed that aliens were smuggled from the Middle East to staging areas in Central and South America, before being smuggled illegally into the US. Prior to the sanctions taking effect, the 11 countries that were later prohibited from military assistance in the Western Hemisphere had 771 students trained by our educational institutions.
132 of these were trained at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and 24 were students at the Senior Service Schools listed above. We have seen and heard comments and actions from the top leaders in the VEAF expressing their support for the U.S. and their intention of maintaining the relationship we have today. Again, this is not due to one officer who attended the U.S. school system, but all of the generations that experienced and got exposed to the U.S. system and culture. This is a great tribute not only to the IMET program, but also to all of the engagement activities (TCA, CDTS, DFT, and SMEE) that have taken place between the VEAF and the United States military and civilian government agencies. Specifically, the NSS notes the United States should spread its influence and "invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge." (NSS at 9) The NSS also recognizes that the U.S., in pursuance of its own strategy, should organize broad conditions, with leadership based on "clear priorities, or appreciation of others' interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility." (NSS at 25) It is unclear at this time what impact these IMET waivers would have on our Article 98 effort. Authorization Act (H.R. 5995). 35 Unfortunately, it has taken over three years for the process to restore the IMET program.
Funding cannot be applied until the continuing resolution expires, probably in the 2 nd quarter of FY 07. Once funding is in place, SouthCom can work with U.S. military schools to determine availability of training slots. The Command expects to receive some students in the U.S. in the 3 rd quarter of FY 07. 36 That means that four years will have transpired before the sanctioned countries can again send armed forces and law enforcement personnel to participate in our educational systems and culture. Some of those young leaders will eventually be the Army The fact that IMET has been decoupled from the sanctions imposed by Article 98 is a great first step in mending the damage that was initiated by a political action intended to protect our soldiers abroad, but which resulted in unintended, negative consequences. However, the sanctions will continue on arms sales and sharing of excess defense articles. These other military sanctions are also detrimental to our military-to-military relationships. We must consider the benefits of lifting these sanctions as well.
Recommendations
We have lost a great opportunity over these last three years to assist in developing the future leaders of our partner nations; we have thus lost any potential influence which could have proven beneficial in the future. Our partner nations have lost multiple opportunities to train their military and security forces in our educational system and to immerse their future leaders into our culture and to cultivate American and international friendships. While we cannot reverse the loss, we can take several steps to arrest the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and improve our standing by making several adjustments. IMET budget loss (a small amount for an oil rich country like Venezuela). Secondly, the sanctions gave Chávez the excuse to further cut off military-to-military interaction with the U.S.
military and the United States lost the best opportunity to influence their armed forces. 40 It is likely that Chávez will deny his military officers the training if it is offered. But then the officers' resentment would be directed at him, not against the United States.
Although we are still under-funding assistance to our neighbors, I believe the Nethercutt Amendment, which cuts $2.5 billion in Economic Support Funds from countries still refusing to sign an Article 98 Agreement, should be the only "stick" that we hold over our partner nations' heads as we execute our strategic diplomacy. We neglect our neighbors' security needs at our own peril.
If we are to achieve the regional security cooperation goals stipulated in our National
Defense and National Military Strategies, we must pursue policies that assist our allies' military forces in achieving those goals. Not only do we need regional cooperation in the global war on terrorism, we also need the assistance of well-trained and equipped security forces capable of analyzing, detecting and eliminating potential transnational threats. Cooperative efforts to decouple IMET from the Article 98 Sanctions have been successful. Fortunately, our policymakers do make adjustments to policies which prove to be detrimental to our national security goals. The next step is to further amend a policy which is keeping the United States Armed
Forces from achieving its security cooperation objectives. In 1989 the UN delegation from Trinidad and Tobago revived the idea of establishing an international criminal court, proposing the creation of a world judicial body capable of dealing with crimes related to international drug trafficking. While the International Law Commission resumed work drafting an ICC statute, the UN established temporary international criminal tribunals to adjudicate cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed during the recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
The International Law Commission submitted an ICC draft statute to the UN General Assembly in 1994, recommending that an international conference be convened to finalize a treaty. Two years later, the UN General Assembly convened the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which allowed UN member states and nongovernmental organizations to begin preliminary negotiations on the text of the statute. The Preparatory Committee held six sessions over more than two years and completed an amended draft statute on April 3, 1998. Never before has the United States been asked to place any of that power outside the complete control of our national government without our consent. Our concern goes beyond the possibility that the Prosecutor will target for indictment the isolated U.S. soldier who violates our own laws and values by allegedly committing a war crime. Our principal concern is for our country's top civilian and military leaders, those responsible for our defense and foreign policy. They are the ones potentially at risk at the hands of the ICC's politically unaccountable Prosecutor, as part of an agenda to restrain American discretion, even when our actions are legitimated by the operation of our own constitutional system. The Prosecutor will answer to no superior executive power, elected or unelected. Nor is there any legislature anywhere in sight, elected or unelected, in the Statute of Rome. The Prosecutor is answerable only to the Court, and then only partially, although the Prosecutor may be removed by the Assembly of States Parties. The Europeans may be comfortable with such a system, but Americans are not.
The Statute of Rome substantially minimized the Security Council's role in ICC affairs. While the Security Council may refer matters to the ICC, or order it to refrain from commencing or proceeding with an investigation or prosecution, the Council is precluded from a meaningful role in the ICC's work. In requiring an affirmative Council vote to stop a case, the Statute shifts the balance of authority from the Council to the ICC. Moreover, a veto by a Permanent Member of such a restraining Council resolution leaves the ICC completely unsupervised. This attempted marginalization of the Security Council is a fundamental new problem created by the ICC that will have a tangible and highly detrimental impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Council now risks having the ICC interfering in its ongoing work, with all of the attendant confusion between the appropriate roles of law, politics, and power in settling international disputes. The Council already has had to take action to dilute the disincentive the ICC poses to nations considering troop contributions to UN-related peacekeeping operations.
Using Article 98 of the Rome Statute as a basis, we are negotiating bilateral, legally-binding agreements with individual States Parties to protect our citizens from being handed over to the Court. Since the European Union's decision in September to permit its member states to conclude Article 98 agreements with the United States, our negotiators have been engaged in bilateral discussions with several EU countries. In the near future we will also be holding discussions on the issue with several countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Our ultimate goal is to conclude Article 98 agreements with every country in the world, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified the ICC, regardless of whether they intend to in the future. These agreements will allow us the necessary protections in a manner that is legally permissible and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute. The following is the entry on IMET and the ensuing comments of Senators Ihenhof and Warner, and GEN Craddock and ADM Stavridis:
INHOFE: There is not a lot of time left, but there is one other subject that I feel very strongly about and that is the IMET program. As you know, in the defense authorization bill that we hope that we'll be able to get here shortly, we have some provisions that give an easier access to that program.
There was a time when it first began that we thought we were doing other countries a favor by allowing them to come here and get training, and that's totally changed, in my thinking, anyway. I think that we're the beneficiaries of this program.
STAVRIDIS: Yes, sir.
INHOFE: And I would like to know, because it will affect all countries. We found out readily that if we have any restrictions in our ability to bring in people to train, the Chinese and others are always there, ready to do it.
Mr. Chairman, I can't think of any single thing that we can do that gives us a greater inside track with these countries than to give the training over here.
So I would like to ask each one of you to comment as to your feeling about the program, and where you see it going.
CRADDOCK: Thank you, Senator.
I would say first that we support the American Service Members Protection Act and, unquestionably, we want our service members protected around the world. Unfortunately, the unintended consequence of that is this International Military Education and Training program, the IMET.
I have been a strong advocate to de-link the IMET program from the ASMPA sanction in order that we can engage and not lose contact with a generation or military exercises, security sessions involving military officers from multiple countries, combined seminars on defense and security, and field trips.
China has military and security interests in Latin America as well. China's presence at Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Cuba directed at the United States is long-standing and well known, but China is establishing military ties in Latin America as well. In addition, Chinese intelligence services are, undoubtedly, active in Latin America and the Caribbean, using Chinese front companies, students, visitors and intelligence officers to steal and exploit technology and commercial secrets of interest to enhance their military prowess and economic competitiveness.
Conclusion
China has achieved unparalleled growth in its power, influence and importance over the last 20 years. Its grand strategy is to become the pre-eminent power in the Pacific--and in the world--replacing the United States as the world's most powerful nation.
Though that point is not here today, China is making progress on both accounts.
The PRC is seeking friends and allies to advance its agenda in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East-and Latin America.
Like most other nations, China is committed to improving the performance of its economy and spreading its political influence. Its actions are worrisome in Latin America and the Caribbean because some national leaders, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, welcome the arrival of another world power to offer an alternative to the United States.
